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SHEILA LINTOTT
Superiority in Humor Theory
abstract
In this article, I consider the standard interpretation of the superiority theory of humor attributed to Plato, Aristotle, and
Hobbes, according to which the theory allegedly places feelings of superiority at the center of humor and comic amusement.
The view that feelings of superiority are at the heart of all comic amusement is wildly implausible. Therefore textual evidence
for the interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, or Hobbes as offering the superiority theory as an essentialist theory of humor is
worth careful consideration. Through textual analysis I argue that not one of these three philosophers defends an essentialist
theory of comic amusement. I also discuss the way various theories of humor relate to one another and the proper place of a
superiority theory in humor theory in light of my analysis.
i. introduction
There are, it is said, three traditional theories of
humor: the superiority theory, the incongruity the-
ory, and the relief theory. However, as some have
pointed out, the theories are not true rivals be-
cause they are not theories of the same thing
(Zamir 2014; Shaw 2010; Smuts 2006; Levinson
1998). As Jerrold Levinson observes, superiority
and relief theories “seem more concerned with
the concomitants or mechanisms of the humorous
reaction than with its conceptual core. Thus, these
competitors of incongruity theory are currently
seen as even less able to provide an adequate an-
swer to the basic question” (Levinson 1998, 564).
The incongruity theory purports to define the for-
mal object of comic amusement, which it locates
in certain kinds of incongruity. The superiority
theory is concerned with the affective response
that often accompanies comic amusement, which
it maintains is an enjoyable feeling of superior-
ity to the object of amusement. Finally, the relief
theory focuses on the expression of comic amuse-
ment in laughter, which it considers a welcome
release of pent up tension and energy. We might
say that the incongruity theory focuses on the cog-
nitive aspects, superiority the emotive, and relief
the physical of comic amusement. So, just as my
heart quickens (physical) and I am fearful (emo-
tive) when I judge (cognitive) a car is about to hit
me, it is likely that the experience of comic amuse-
ment often includes some or all of these aspects.
Perhaps a disjunctive account, according to which
humor aims to satisfy one ormore human interest,
as Tzachi Zamir (2014) suggests, offers the most
comprehensive way of capturing the nature and
value of comic amusement.
Some presentations of the superiority theory
are more measured than others. David Monro
says, “According to any superiority theory of hu-
mor, the laugher always looks down on whatever
he laughs at, and so judges it inferior by some
standard” (1988, 349). Others give the theory a
more limited and more reasonable scope. For ex-
ample, Eva Dadlez states: “Superiority theories
ally humor principally with ridicule and the en-
joyment of one’s own superiority in pinpointing
the foibles or weaknesses of another” (2011, 2).
In her discussion of offensive humor, Jeannette
Bicknell explains: “There is an element of malice
in much humor. (That slipping on a banana peel
is funny does not make the fall any less painful,
after all.) A good deal of our laughter in comedy
is directed at misfortune, presented in such a way
as to elicit amusement rather than outrage, tears
or compassion” (2007, 458).
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74:4 Fall 2016
C© 2016 The American Society for Aesthetics
348 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
As these latter construals suggest, the superior-
ity theory is not best understood as a stand-alone
theory, but better as a way of describing a sort of
comic amusement we may have to a certain kind
of humor. Rather than defining humor per se, the
superiority theory explains the nature and value
of some humor, allows us to distinguish among
the experiences of different kinds of humor, and
articulates some issues and debates concerning
the ethics and etiquette of some humor. But de-
spite how obvious the proper role of the superi-
ority theory is upon contemplation, the theory is
often presented as a stand-alone, comprehensive
theory of humor. A counterargument or multiple
counterexamples then follow; set it up and knock
it down. For the sake of clarity, in the following,
I lay bare the myth of the superiority theory as
an essentialist theory of humor by which I mean a
stand-alone theory that aims to articulate the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions of comic amuse-
ment at the humorous. Undoubtedly, some read-
ers are already convinced an essentialist version
of the superiority theory of humor is unaccept-
able and some are likely skeptical of claims that
the likes of Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes thought
it acceptable. However, it may not be obvious to
everyone that an essentialist or similarly strong
version of a superiority theory of humor is im-
plausible. Roger Scruton, for example, currently
defends a version of a superiority theory of comic
amusement as “attentive demolition” (1987, 169).
Furthermore, given the frequency with which the
theory is presented as essentialist and attributed
to Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, it is worth con-
sidering the textual evidence for an essentialist
interpretation of the superiority theory.
My plan for the remainder of this essay is as
follows. In Section II, I survey some presenta-
tions of the superiority theory of humor as it is
traditionally construed. I then argue, too easily
as we shall see, that construed as such, the the-
ory is wildly implausible. In Sections III, IV, and
V, I consider the relevant texts of Plato, Aristo-
tle, and Hobbes, showing that each is misinter-
preted when said to defend an essentialist ver-
sion of the superiority theory. In the cases of
Plato and Aristotle, I show definitively that nei-
ther held such a view; in the case of Hobbes,
I raise serious skepticism about how to inter-
pret his comments on laughter and comic amuse-
ment. Given the implausibility of the superior-
ity theory as a theory of all and only humor,
in Section VI I discuss the contributions a non-
essentialist version of it can make within humor
theory.
ii. superiority theory: the standard account
Typically, the superiority theory is cast as an at-
tempt to account for all cases of humor. For exam-
ple,AdrianBardon says “The superiority theory is
the theory that the humor we find in comedy and
in life is based on ridicule, wherein we regard the
object of amusement as inferior and/or ourselves
as superior” (2005, 463). Although she admits that
many so-called theories of humor are “actually de-
scriptions of conditions under which humor may
be experienced rather than attempts to explain
humor,” Patricia Keith-Spiegel puts it like this:
“According to the principle of superiority, mock-
ery, ridicule, and laughter at the foolish actions
of others are central to the humor experience”
(1972, 5–6). In other words, the superiority theory
maintains that ridicule and feelings of relative su-
periority are essential components of humor. This
theory is standardly attributed to Plato, Aristo-
tle, and Hobbes, and Hobbes’s thoughts on laugh-
ter are considered its paradigmatic articulation.
John Morreall, the prolific philosopher of laugh-
ter and humor, construes the superiority theory in
this same way: “The oldest, and probably still the
most widespread theory of laughter is that laugh-
ter is an expression of a person’s feelings of supe-
riority over other people. This theory goes back at
least as far as Plato and Aristotle, and was given
its classic statement in Hobbes” (1982, 243–244).
Morreall admits that the superiority theory can
account also for self-deprecating humor, as when
he characterizes the superiority theory as a theory
of laughter: “psychological theory articulating the
view of laughter that started in Plato and the Bible
and dominated Western thinking about laughter
for twomillennia. . . . Simply put, our laughter ex-
presses feelings of superiority over other people
or over a former state of ourselves” (2013).
But, understood this way, is the theory even re-
motely plausible? Is it plausible to believe that all
laughter is derisive? In the introductory philos-
ophy course I teach on the philosophy of laugh-
ter, it takes students about ten seconds to amass
numerous counterexamples to the superiority
theory, such as laughing at a pun, laughing with
joy at another’s accomplishment, laughing at an
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innocent joke, laughing with a person who makes
a witty remark, laughing at an incongruity, laugh-
ing in surprise, and laughing out of nervousness.
Some of these counterexamples might miss their
mark if the superiority theory is meant to cap-
ture only cases of humorous laughter, but this is
surely a mistaken concession. In any case, most
of the alleged counterexamples, such as laughing
with a witty person or at an innocent joke, are
clearly legitimate counterexamples to the supe-
riority theory as a comprehensive theory of hu-
morous laughter. The theory then cannot account
for the distinction we make every day between
laughing at and laughing with others. As an essen-
tialist theory of humor, the superiority theory fails
terribly.
It is strange, then, that thinkers as astute stu-
dents of human nature and human life such as
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes apparently held such
an obviously flawed and extreme theory. How-
ever, it is not the theory that is at fault; rather,
it is the commentators who have offered hasty
and overly simplistic caricatures instead of char-
itable and careful interpretations of the works
concerned. As Aaron Smuts points out, “Neither
Plato nor Aristotle makes clear pronouncements
about the essence of humor, though their com-
ments are preoccupied with the role of feelings
of superiority in our finding something funny”
(Smuts 2006). I agree with Smuts that neither
Plato nor Aristotle, and I will add Hobbes, es-
poused superiority theory as an essentialist com-
prehensive theory of humorous laughter.
In the next three sections, I show that not one
of the three can be said to hold or defend a supe-
riority theory of laughter if such a theory is taken
to claim that superiority is either necessary or suf-
ficient for laughter, let alone if it is taken to claim
that superiority is both necessary and sufficient
for laughter. The textual evidence, when consid-
ered in context, shows that at most each can be
said to hold only that superiority explains some
humor. Reading anything stronger into their the-
ories is an error. I proceed here chronologically,
beginning with a consideration of Plato’s, then
Aristotle’s, and finally Hobbes’s thoughts on hu-
mor. Hobbes, as we will see, is the most difficult
case for my thesis, which is that the superiority
theory is not best understood as a theory of hu-
mor but rather as a tool for understanding one
particular kind of humor and its social, ethical,
and aesthetic implications.
iii. plato on humor and laughter
Plato discusses humor and laughter in several
places, most extensively in a short section of the
Philebus, but also in the Republic, and he men-
tions laughter in passing in a several works includ-
ing the Symposium and Lysis. In addition, in the
Euthydemus, Plato notably employs much humor.
Plato’s theory of humor is taken primarily from
his Philebus, as the linguist Salvatore Attardo
states:
The passages that concern humor (48c/50a) are taken
from a review of various emotions like anger, pity, etc.
Plato puts humor in the field of the “ridiculous.” Who-
ever does not follow the Delphic Oracle’s admonition
“Know thyself,” or in other words, lacks self-knowledge,
is defined as ridiculous. Without doubt, the ridiculous is
seen by Plato as belonging to the category of πονηρι´α
(perversion, evil). (1994, 19)
Plato’s Philebus is a difficult dialogue about the
nature of pleasure and whether the best life is one
of intellectualism or hedonism. In it, Plato uses
the pleasure of laughter, specifically laughter at
the ridiculous, to illustrate how some pleasures
are tainted with pain. Laughter at the ridiculous,
he claims, is tainted with the pain associated with
the disharmony malice wreaks on the soul. When
we laugh at a ridiculous character portrayed in
comedy, Plato contends, we are laughing at that
person’s self-ignorance. Self-ignorance, for Plato,
is an evil; it is a serious vice, as Socrates tells
Protarchus. Obviously, given the importance he
affords self-knowledge, Plato does not take this
matter lightly.
Although in the Philebus the focus of the dis-
cussion is initially on comedy, the scope of Plato’s
concern expands to encompass laughter at friends,
and so Socrates concludes:
Our argument leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at
what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure
with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain. For we
had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul, that
laughing is a pleasure, and that both occur together on
those occasions. (1993, 50e13–16)
This passage is often referred to in discussion of
Plato’s theory of humor and laughter. In The Phi-
losophy of Laughter and Humor, Morreall sums
up Plato’s ideas:
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Whatwe laugh at, in Plato’s view, is vice, particularly self-
ignorance, in people who are relatively powerless. Our
amusement is a kind of malice toward such people, he
thought, and this should make us wary of amusement,
but so should the fact that amusement is an emotion
in which we tend to lose rational control of ourselves.
(1987, 10)
Noe¨l Carroll claims “for Plato, amusement con-
tains anelement ofmalice” (2014, 6; see also 2003).
Simon Critchley tells how Plato’s view that en-
joying humor entails viciousness led him to for-
bid laughter “to the virtuous guardians of Plato’s
imagined philosophical city” and “dominates the
philosophical tradition until the eighteenth cen-
tury” (2002, 3). Bardon says:
[Plato] explains that the object of laughter in comedy is
the “ridiculous.” The ridiculous, more specifically, is the
self-ignorance of others when they falsely believe that
they possess wisdom. In other words, laughter results
from a feeling of pleasure at seeing others suffer the
misfortune of being deluded about their own wisdom.
Socrates argues, however, that the soul experiences both
“pleasure and pain” when amused by the ridiculous por-
trayed in comedy: one can feel pleasure and laugh when
presented by such fools in comedy, but to feel pleasure
at others’ misfortunes is to feel malice, which he consid-
ers a “pain of the soul.” The laughter and pleasure, then,
that we experience when enjoying comedy is mixed with
malice and pain. (2005, 463)
Despite the commonness of this interpretation,
interpreting Plato as equating laughter with mal-
ice is a mistake. First of all, Plato cannot believe
superiority is sufficient for laughter because he
contrasts the ridiculous and the odious or hateful
on the grounds that while both are judged flawed
for their self-ignorance, the ridiculous is relatively
weak, and the hateful is relatively strong.
For ignorance on the side of the strong and powerful is
odious and ugly; it is hurtful even for their neighbors,
both the ignorance itself and its imitations, whatever
they may be. Ignorance on the side of the weak, by con-
trast, deserves to be placed among the ridiculous in rank
and nature. (1993 49c)
Thus, our hatred of self-ignorant yet powerful
people involves a feeling of superiority due to
their self-ignorance, but, due to their strength and
perhaps their related capacity to harm through
ignorance or retaliate against mockery, it does not
provoke laughter. Moreover, although perhaps
not consistent with all of his philosophical views,
and perhaps in a case of Socratic irony, Plato ap-
pears to reserve malicious laughter for our friends
when he denies “any injustice or malice” when we
“rejoice about evils that happen to your friends”
(1993 49d).
But does Plato even think superiority is neces-
sary for laughter? He never directly says that we
laugh only at the ridiculous, although he does ad-
mit that we sometimes do. Admittedly, the Greek
work for ‘ridiculous’ is understood in terms of
something being laughable, so all ridiculous things
are laughable, but are all laughable things ridicu-
lous? In his analysis, Mitchell Miller suggests that
Plato’s discussion of laughter in the Philebus does
not amount to a wholesale moral condemnation
of laughter:
Should we be disturbed that Socrates identifies ψθόνος
[the feeling of malice] at the heart of this pleasure? If we
focus on his purpose in surveying various pleasures, not
at all. He is at work collecting all the kinds of pleasure
in preparation for the later task of selecting some of
them as ingredients in the good life. He is doing a non-
judgmental phenomenology, and it is appropriate that he
acknowledge pleasure wherever he finds it; the moral-
critical work of separating the ethically good pleasures
from the ethically bad ones will come later. (2008, 268)
All that can be inferred from the Philebus argu-
ment regarding laughter is that laughing at the
ridiculous is malicious and is thus explicable in
terms of superiority. This leaves open the possibil-
ity that sometimeswe laughwithoutmaliciousness
or feelings of superiority.
Moreover, Plato does appear to think that
some laughter, laughter at enemies, may not be
malicious:
Socrates: Now, if you rejoice about evils that happen
to your enemy, is there any injustice or malice in your
pleasure?
Protarchus: How should there be?
Socrates: But is there any occasion when it is not un-
just to be pleased rather than pained to see bad things
happen to your friends?
Protarchus: Clearly not.
Socrates: But we just agreed that ignorance is bad for
everyone?
Protarchus: Right. (1993 49d)
Lintott Superiority in Humor Theory 351
When we laugh at our enemies’ ignorance, then,
it is not malicious. The pleasure of such laughter
it seems is mixed with pain according to Plato,
seemingly because it is appropriate, rather than
malicious, to enjoy bad things happening to one’s
enemies. Although the Socrates of the Philebus
generally seems “devoid of any touch of Socratic
irony,” this may be a bit of Socratic irony that goes
undeveloped (Jowett 1871, 130). However, even if
so, it, in fact, is an instance of nonmalicious humor.
Is there room inPlato’s theory for nonmalicious
or nonridiculing laughter? Nothing he says in the
Philebus rules out this possibility, but is there tex-
tual evidence for it here or elsewhere? Is there
evidence, for example, that Plato is aware of the
difference between laughing with and laughing at.
The superiority theory is usually interpreted as
leaving no room for laughing with. It reduces all
laughter, including apparent instances of laughing
with, to laughing at.
Plato is aware of the distinction between laugh-
ing at and laughing with as is evidenced in
Aristophanes’s post-hiccupping speech in the
Symposium.
You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing. I will
unsay my words; but do you please not to watch me, as I
fear that in the speechwhich I am about tomake, instead
of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born
of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be
laughed at by them. (1892c, 189b, my emphasis)
The distinction drawn is between γε´λοιος,
which means mirth provoking or amusing, and
καταγε´λαστος, meaning ridiculous or inviting
ridicule.1
We also see the notion of the amusing in the
beginning of Book V of the Republic. Socrates
admits to Glaucon that he sometimes enjoys what
he calls “innocent laughter”:
That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall destroy my
friends as well as myself.Not that I mind a little innocent
laughter; but he who kills the truth is amurderer. (1892b,
V, 451a, emphasis added)
Finally, in the Lysis, Plato depicts the friends
laughing together, not at each other, butwith each
other:
That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.
Andwhich is the nobler? Is that also amatter of dispute?
Yes, certainly.
And another disputed point is, which is the fairer?
The two boys laughed. (1892a, 207c2–6)
Obviously, Plato is aware that not all humor in-
volves the ridiculous and not all laughter at the
humorous is malicious.
Just as Plato’s inquiry into poetry leads him to
conclude that the vastmajority of poetry should be
banned from the ideal city-state, likewise his con-
siderations of laughter take aim at a problematic
kind of laughter: ridicule. In the Philebus, Plato
discusses laughing in ridicule as a case of mixed
pleasure, which does not entail that all laughing is
ridiculing. Stephen Halliwell makes the case that
Plato’s conceptions of humor and comic amuse-
ment are complex and cannot be properly under-
stood from the Philebus alone: “For example, the
connection between laughter and phthonos in the
Philebus does not recur in any other Platonic text.
. . . There is no contradiction here but a concen-
tration on different aspects of comedy/laughter in
different contexts” (Halliwell 2008, 301). Regard-
ing art, Plato’s attention, we are well aware, is
frequently drawn to the most ethically and episte-
mologically suspect. When he discusses laughter
and comedy, he sometimes focuses on the ways
comedy and laughter can provide guilty pleasures
or distance us fromone another.Yet, it is amistake
to conclude that he saw all laughter this way.
iv. aristotle on humor and laughter
DefendingAristotle from the claim that his theory
of laughter insists superiority is necessary or suffi-
cient for laughter is a relatively easy task.Aristotle
discusses laughter in the Nicomachean Ethics, the
Rhetoric, and in his Poetics.
Most commentators, from Francis Hutche-
son to John Morreall, mention in passing that
Aristotle’s discussions of laughter include ele-
ments of incongruity. For instance, in theRhetoric,
he discusses the pleasure of apprehending incon-
gruity and the skill at presenting it in a humorous
manner:
And the greatest number of elegant effects are the result
ofmetaphor combinedwithmisdirection. For it becomes
more evident inwhat respect one learns somethingwhen
it goes against a disposition toward the opposite, and the
soul seems to say “How true, and yet I missed it.” In the
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case of quips, the elegant ones result from not meaning
what one is saying. . . . And well-made riddles are pleas-
ing for the same reason, for learning and metaphor are
involved, and what Theodorus calls speaking in innova-
tive ways. This happens when something is paradoxical
and not, as he puts it, “by our prior” opinion, but like the
turns of phrase in things that make us laugh (which jokes
are capable of doing even by a turn in a letter, since it
surprises us) and in poetic verses. (2009, 1412a19–30)
Morreall suggests thatAristotle does not fully pur-
sue the question of how incongruity factors into
laughter because by the time it occurred to him in
the Rhetoric, he already committed himself to a
superiority theory inNicomachean Ethics and Po-
etics: “The incongruity theory was first hinted at
byAristotle; though because it did not fit neatly in
with the superiority theory of hisPoetics andNico-
machean Ethics, he never developed it” (Morreall
1983, 16).
The Poetics may give us the most insight into
Aristotle’s theory of humor. The text as we have
it is more informative about tragedy and epic po-
etry than it is about comedy. Whether Aristotle
never wrote a treatise on comedy or he did and
it is lost to us, we can lament the fact that we do
not have access to his full thoughts on the mat-
ter. What we do have access to in Book I of the
Poetics does not support an essentialist interpre-
tation of Aristotle’s discussion of superiority in
comic amusement, although it also does not rule
out such an interpretation.
But there is evidence that Aristotle was not of-
fering a superiority theory as an essentialist theory
of humor in the Nicomachean Ethics, given that
in it he discusses the mean between the vicious
extremes of laughter. In Book IV of the Nico-
machean Ethics, Aristotle does describe a form
of laughter that distinctively involves ridicule and
derision, that of the vulgar buffoon: “Now those
who go to excess in making people laugh seem to
be crude buffoons, greedily eager to do anything
for a laugh, and aiming at causing laughter rather
than at speaking gracefully without causing pain
to the one who is made fun of” (2002, 1128a4–7).
Immediately prior to this remark, however,
Aristotle also points out that not all laughter is
of this sort and explicitly describes how the plea-
sure of laughter can be harmoniously enjoyed:
But since in life there is also relaxation, and in this there
is a playful way of passing the time, here too there seems
to be a harmonious way of associating with people—
sorts of things that one ought to say, and a way of saying
them, and likewise a way of taking what is said. (2002,
1127b35–1128a3)
Aristotle reiterates the idea that not all laughter is
derisive again when characterizing the charming
or virtuous way to amuse: “Those who are play-
ful in a harmonious way are called charming, as
being readily flexible, for such acts seem to be
motions that come from one’s character” (2002,
1128a9–11).
The tasteful person will amuse and be amused
without bringing pain or disharmony. This person
has scruples and knows when, and about what, not
to joke: “Someone with a gracious and generous
spirit will hold himself to such limits, being like
a law to himself” (2002, 1128a33). If, therefore,
Aristotle’s theory includes recognition of the role
of incongruity in laughter and of the rhetorical
skills needed to employ it harmoniously, then he
cannot be said to hold that superiority is either
necessary or sufficient for humorous laugher.
Finally, it is worth briefly considering themyste-
rious text called theTractatusCoislinianus, usually
associated with Aristotle, although in different
ways by different scholars. Richard Janko (1987)
argues it is notes on Aristotle’s (believed by most
to be) lost writing on comedy. Lane Cooper main-
tains “the most natural explanation is that the
Poetics once included an explicit inquiry into the
sources of comic effect—something analogous to,
or possibly in essentials identical with, the analysis
of the sources of laughter in theTractatus Coislini-
anus” (1922, 8).
Whether it is a work of Aristotle’s or in some
way related to it, theTractatus is clearly influenced
by Aristotlean theory. So, it is not without interest
that in it, three possible sorts of comic charac-
ters are listed: “The characters [ethe] of comedy
are (1) the buffoonish, (2) the ironical, and (3)
those of the imposters” (Cooper 1922, 226). Tomy
mind, none of these sorts of characters requires
a feeling of superiority to evoke comic amuse-
ment. The buffoonish is the most likely candidate
for derision, yet are all buffoonish people thereby
judged inferior? Consider, for example, Robert
Solomon’s discussion of the Three Stooges, buf-
foonishness if ever there were any.
No one, to my knowledge, has advocated what we might
call the inferiority theory of humor, laughter as the great
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leveler, beyond contempt or indignation, antithetical
to pretention and pomp. Sitting on the sofa watching
Malice in the Palace for the twenty-seventh time, we
allow ourselves to fall into a world of miniature may-
hem in which we feel as foolish as they are. (Solomon
1992, 146)
Wemay ormay not believe that all buffoonery can
evoke comic amusement involving feelings of infe-
riority or self-censure. But we can, perhaps, admit
with Solomon that comic characters, even when
acting fools or confessing their faults, as many
stand-up comedians make careers of, can make
us feel likewise implicated or even inferior rather
than superior.2
Moreover, the Tractatus Coislinianus does not
isolate buffoonery as the whole of comedy. Char-
acters who are ironical or imposters, perhaps ex-
emplified today in the political humor of Jon Stew-
art in The Daily Show or Stephen Colbert in The
Colbert Report and in comic impersonations such
as Tina Fey’s impersonation of Sarah Palin on Sat-
urday Night Live or Dave Chappelle’s of Prince
on Chappelle’s Show, need not, although in some
cases they may, make anyone feel superior to the
performer or to the target(s) of the humor.3
v. hobbes on humor and laughter
Hobbes is the philosopher most wholly and con-
fidently associated with the standard version of
the superiority theory. And for good reason, given
that most of what he says about laughter (and
much else!) is pretty negative. Michael Billig ex-
plains, “Hobbes puts ridicule at the centre of
humour and thereby questions the goodness of
laughter. He is telling us to look behind the smiles
and the jests. If we do so, then we will see some-
thing not too pleasant” (2005, 52).
Yet, to interpretHobbes’s remarks about laugh-
ter as articulating an essentialist superiority the-
ory of humorous laughter is, in the first place,
uncharitable. Although his thoughts on laughter
are often said to amount to a theory of laughter,
this interpretation is derived from his explicit con-
templation on laughter limited to two brief reflec-
tions in the Leviathan and Human Nature, about
550words in total (1839b, IX, 13; 1839a,VI).When
Hobbes discusses laughter it is in the context of
exploring and illustrating the passions in light of
his overall picture of human beings as basically
competitive, self-interested creatures and his re-
lated views on the justified and necessary system
of government.
The passage most frequently cited in the con-
text of presenting Hobbes’s so-called theory of
laughter comes from Human Nature when he as-
serts that: “the passion of laughter is nothing else
but a sudden glory arising from sudden concep-
tion of some eminency in ourselves, by compari-
son with the infirmities of others, or with our own
formerly” (1839b, IX, 13). With attention to the
phrase “nothing else but,” it seems reasonable
to interpret this as a claim that laughter can be
wholly identified with the feeling of superiority. In
other words, and according to the most common
interpretation of Hobbes on laughter, he holds a
strong essentialist version of the superiority the-
ory according to which feeling superior is always
necessary and sufficient for laughter.
However, is Hobbes really committed to the
view that superiority is necessary and sufficient
for laughter? Francis Hutcheson, for one, reads
Hobbes this way: “If Mr. Hobbes’s notion be just,
then, first, there can be no laughter on any occa-
sion . . . where we do not observe some superior-
ity to ourselves above some other thing: and again,
itmust follow, that every sudden appearance of su-
periority over another must excite laughter when
we attend to it” (Hutcheson 1750, 7). There are
times when it seems that Hobbes is presenting the
sort of theory Hutcheson attributes to him, again,
such as when he tells us that laughter is “nothing
else but a sudden glory arising from sudden con-
ception of some eminency in ourselves” (1839b,
IX, 13, emphasis altered). However, when con-
sidered in the context of everything Hobbes says
about laughter, his statement that laughter is noth-
ing but an expression of superiority stands out as
hyperbole.
Maybe Hobbes does believe that literally any
feeling of superiority is sufficient for laughter and
comic amusement. After all, he denies wit is nec-
essary for laughter when he asserts that laughter is
often aroused in absence ofwit: “laughter, which is
always joy. . . . That it consisteth inwit, or, as they
call it, in the jest, this experience confuteth; for
men laugh atmischances and indecencies, wherein
there lieth no wit or jest at all” (Human Nature,
IX, 13). In other words, Hobbes denies wit or jest
is always present in thatwhich evokes our laughter
and thereby maintains that feelings of superiority
alone can be sufficient for laughter.
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However, not only does he deny wit is enough,
he also denies superiority alone will suffice, insist-
ing that novelty is also needed. For example, when
he elaborates on the joy that laughter is an expres-
sion of, he insists its cause must be surprising and
incongruous: “And forasmuch as the same thing is
no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual,
whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must
be new and unexpected” (1839b,IX, 13). “Must be
new and unexpected”; in other words, superiority
is not sufficient for laughter given that, in the ab-
sence of novelty and incongruity, superiority will
not evoke laughter. Thus, Hobbes believes there
is more to laughter than superiority and appears
to hold a theory of laughter that places novelty
and incongruity in a central position. Hence, just
as it is wrong to conclude that incongruity, even
novel incongruity, is always sufficient for laugh-
ter according to Hobbes, it is likewise wrong to
conclude he maintains that superiority is always
sufficient.
If not sufficient, perhaps Hobbes thinks su-
periority is necessary for laughter? Admittedly
he does speak of derisive laughter, as when he
mentions the disposition to laugh when another
falls, “to see another fall, is disposition to laugh”
(1839b, IX, 21) or the dishonor of mocking, “to re-
vile, mock, or pity, is to dishonor” (1839a, X, 25).
However, if Hobbes makes the distinction we find
in Plato between laughing at and laughing with,
we have reason to question whether he makes a
claim to necessity as well. Hobbes does distinguish
between cases of ridicule and something akin to
shared amusement, as we see when he explains
why men hate being laughed at and opens the
possibility of laughing in an unridiculing manner,
“where all the companymay laugh together”: “It is
nowonder, therefore, thatmen take it heinously to
be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over.
Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities
and infirmities abstracted frompersons, andwhere
all the company may laugh together” (1839b, IX,
13).
Noting cases of communal laughter where no
one is derided, Hutcheson sought to object to
Hobbes on the grounds that we often admire
and sometimes seek to imitate people who amuse
us. Hutcheson points out “laughter often arises
without any imagined superiority of ourselves”
and “laughter in those who may have the highest
veneration . . . and also admire the wit of the per-
son who makes the allusion” (Hutcheson 1750,
7–8). He then wonders, “what sudden sense of
glory, or joy in our superiority, can arise from ob-
serving a quality in another, which we study to
imitate, I cannot imagine” (8). Morreall follows
Hutcheson in interpreting the claim of necessity
into Hobbes’s writing on laughter, arguing that
“the proper way to criticize the Hobbesian the-
ory, I think, is to show that not all cases of laugh-
ter involve feelings of superiority, and hence that
the expression of “sudden glory” cannot be the
essence of laughter” (Morreall 1982, 244).
However, insofar as Hobbes allows for non-
derisive laughter being evoked by a clever mind
via fancy or wit, the target of Hutcheson’s admi-
ration counterexample evaporates. We find evi-
dence that Hobbes agrees with the admiration
Hutcheson describes for some who are able to
make us laugh when, in the Leviathan, he ex-
presses his admiration for wit and its products:
"All actions, and speeches, that proceed, or seem
to proceed from much experience, science, dis-
cretion, or wit, are honorable” (1839a, X, 42).
This suggests not only that Hobbes agrees with
Hutcheson’s case of admiring rather than feeling
superior to an amusing performer or writer, it also
shows that Hobbes does not think superiority is
necessary for laughter. Consider further the ad-
miration he expresses for wit in The Elements of
Law:
That quick ranging of mind . . . which is joined with
curiosity of comparing the things that come into the
mind, one with another: in which comparison a man
delighteth himself either with finding unexpected simil-
itude of things otherwise much unlike (in which men
place the excellency of fancy, and from whence proceed
those grateful similes, metaphors, and other tropes, by
which both poets and orators4 have it in their power to
make things please or displease, and show well or ill to
others, as they like themselves), or else in discerning sud-
denly dissimilitude in things that otherwise appear the
same. . . . For to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish
or discern: and both fancy and judgment are commonly
comprehended under the name of wit, which seemeth
to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that
restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.
(1839b, X, 4)
Wit, for Hobbes,may be a virtue or ability of mind
employed in detecting and expressing superiority,
but there is no textual evidence to believe this
is its only domain. It is more reasonable to read
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Hobbes as referring to the noting of differences
and making of comparisons generally; in other
words, wit is skill and ability in detecting and ex-
pressing incongruities. Apprehending incongruity
generally is at the heart of wit for Hobbes: wit
is evidenced in “finding unexpected similitude of
things, otherwise much unlike” and “discerning
suddenly dissimilitude in things that otherwise ap-
pear the same.” If so, it is reasonable to question
whether Hobbes really does advance a strict and
essentialist theory of laughter or whether, for him,
comic amusement may sometimes be the result
of apprehending incongruity without any relative
judgments of persons.
Finally, the logic of the oft-quoted passage
on laughter in the Leviathan warrants scrutiny.
Hobbes tells us: “Sudden glory is the passion
which maketh those grimaces called laughter;
and is caused either by some sudden act of their
own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension
of some deformed thing in another, by compari-
son whereof they suddenly applaud themselves”
(1839a,VI).Hobbes’s claim that laughter is caused
by superiority is usually taken to mean that supe-
riority is necessary for laughter. But, of course, a
causal claim like this one has several possible in-
terpretations. “Superiority causes laughter” could
mean that laughter is sufficient for superiority, as
in “weight loss is caused by ingesting fewer calo-
ries or increased physical activity.” This claimmay
mean that these are the only ways to lose weight,
but that would be an implausible causal claim;
for example, severe illness in the absence of de-
creased caloric intake or increased physical activ-
ity can also be sufficient for weight loss. In other
words, Hobbes’s oft-cited “definition” of laughter
in theLeviathanmightmerely amount to the claim
that one, but not the only, way to evoke laughter
is through evoking feelings of superiority. If so,
Hobbes is committed to the claim that superiority
can cause laughter and the joy it is often an ex-
pression of, but not that it is always (or the only
thing) involved in said joy.
Like Plato and Aristotle before him, Hobbes’s
views on laughter are more nuanced than is often
admitted, and this nuance ismissedwhen the com-
ments are considered independent of their con-
text. Whereas Plato and Aristotle spoke of humor
and laughter largely in terms of ethical consider-
ations, Hobbes spoke of humor and laughter in
terms of his views of human nature and the social
and political arrangements best suited to it. In this
context, it is not surprising that Hobbes is most
interested in laughter involving superiority and
evidencing our competitive tendencies. However,
as his comments on jest and wit make clear, it is a
mistake to read Hobbes as insisting that laughter
always or only involves the particular satisfaction
felt in one’s perceived superiority.
vi. conclusion: the role of superiority in
humor theory
Despite received wisdom, neither Plato nor
Aristotle nor Hobbes can be said to be superiority
theorists if by that we mean, as per Monro, the
view that “the pleasure we take in humor derives
fromour feeling of superiority over thosewe laugh
at. According to this view, all humor is derisive”
(1988, 350). This is not to say that these philoso-
phers denied that feelings of superiority are some-
times, perhaps even often, involved in laughter. I
have attempted to show that these philosophers
did not hold a superiority theory of laughter, al-
though they each did think of superiority laughter
as an important and common species of laughter.
Indeed, my analysis suggests that Plato and Aris-
totle weremost concerned about, andHobbes was
most interested in, derisive laughter.
If we take the superiority theory as the view
that superiority is necessary and sufficient, or even
merely either necessary or sufficient, for laugh-
ter, it is an implausible theory, a straw-man that,
instead of providing insight into the nature and
value of humor and comic amusement, stands as
an easy target for counterexamples. People often
laugh without any feeling of superiority, and feel-
ings of superiority often fail to evoke laughter. It
does not take much reflection to realize this. It is
strange then that anyone has ever espoused this
theory as a comprehensive theory of the essence
of laugher, let alone philosophers of the caliber of
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. Their thoughts on
humor and laughter are presented in the context
of other discussions,whichmeans that interpreting
their musings about humorous laughter calls for
heightened adherence to the principle of charity.
Tomymind, this is not the approach that has been
taken in interpreting these philosophers’ thoughts
on the topic.
Given this, it is also difficult to understand
why anyone ever accepted this interpretation of
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes. When and why did
the interpretation of the superiority theory as an
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essentialist theory become received wisdom and
why has this interpretation gone unquestioned for
so long. Here I can merely speculate. Perhaps one
factor is too heavy a reliance on secondary litera-
ture. For example, without blaming him, Smuts
traces the “oversimplification” of seeing three
main theories of humor as mutually exclusive to
David Monro:
The standard analysis, developed by D. H. Monro, that
classifies humor theories into superiority, incongruity,
and relief theories sets up a false expectation of genuine
competition between the views. Rarely do any of the
historical theorists in any of these schools state their
theories as listing necessary of sufficient conditions for
something to count as humor, much less put their views
in competition with others. (Smuts 2006)
Moreover, none of the philosophers traditionally
credited with an essentialist superiority theory of-
fered a full treatise on laughter or humor (and we
do not have Aristotle’s if he did) and, in many
cases, this is similarly true in today’s philosophy
of humor. Often theorists come to the topic of
humor with an interest that leads them to focus
on issues and problems other than the nature of
humor per se; therefore, the taxonomy of three
main theories, each essentialist (which is also sus-
pect), is the starting point for, rather than the
object of, inquiry. For example, Ronald de Sousa
(1990) discusses humor and laughter in the con-
text of working out a theory of emotion; Merrie
Bergmann (1986) in attempting to articulate the
nature and harm of sexist humor; Dadlez (2011),
Cynthia Willett (2008), and Cynthia Willett and
JulieWillett (2014) in interrogating subversive hu-
mor; Luvell Anderson (2015) in theorizing racist
humor; and Carroll (2014), Bicknell (2007), and
David Benatar (2014) in investigating the ethics of
humor. Like Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, many
philosophers interested in humor theory today are
focused on certain aspects of some kinds of humor
less so than on the very nature of humor as such.
As Smuts says,
Rather than clearly offering a superiority theory of hu-
mor, Plato and Aristotle focus on this common comic
feature, bringing it to our attention for ethical consider-
ations. . . . However, if we evaluate the weaker version
of the superiority theory—that humor is often fueled
by feelings of superiority—then we have a fairly well
supported empirical claim, easily confirmable by first
hand observation. (2006).
Given how easily confirmable this empirical claim
is, it is worth asking whether we should continue
to theorize in terms of “the superiority theory” at
all. I believe that, although not as an essentialist
theory, the superiority theory can still play an im-
portant role in humor theory. It is obviously, and
perhaps trivially, true that superiority sometimes
plays a key role in some cases of humor and comic
amusement at it. However, it is worth thinking
through different versions of the superiority the-
ory, understoodas a theoryof some,not all,humor,
whether it is Plato’s concern about how our laugh-
ter can express complicity with others’ (and our
own!) self-ignorance, Aristotle’s view that laugh-
ter can serve as a social corrective, or Hobbes’s
emphasis on the agonistic aspects laughter can
involve. These different theories, understood cor-
rectly, canhelpus articulate the aesthetic successes
and failures of and related ethical issues raised by
some cases of humor. Not all humor involving su-
periority is funny, yet some very much is; and not
all humor involving superiority is ethically prob-
lematic, yet some verymuch is. For example, there
is rule among comedians that “punching up” is
generally (always?) permissible whereas “punch-
ing down” is generally not (always?). Thinking of
the superiority theory along with considerations
of agents and targets of humor, context, power
relations, and other dynamics and in conjunction
with other theories of humor can help us better
track the aesthetics and the ethics of humor.
Indeed, all of the traditional theories humor—
superiority, relief, and incongruity—are somewhat
accurate and very interesting in their own right;
some comic amusement is enjoying a certain kind
of perceived incongruity that gives one a feel-
ing of superiority reducing psychic and/or bod-
ily energy via expression in laughter. Such a con-
joined account explains a great deal about a great
deal of comic amusement. For example, it tells us
what is so enjoyable about the cluelessness of the
character Michael Scott, the regional manager of
a small paper company, played by Steve Carell
in the U.S. version of the NBC television series
The Office (2005–2013). We find Scott’s behav-
ior incongruous with our expectations of profes-
sional and even personal life, and we enjoy feel-
ing that we are more self-aware than he appears
to be, which results in an expression of laughter
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releasing some of the stress and tension of our
everyday lives. Admittedly, I would not maintain
that every case of comic amusement would fit this
conjoined characterization. For example, not all
cases of comic amusement involve perceiving in-
congruity, as for example when I am comically
amused when a well-known stand-up comedian
such as Dave Chappelle responds to a heckler in
a way that is “so him,” “so Chappelle.” Likewise,
not all cases of comic amusement involve feeling
superior, as when I revel in the wisdom and cut-
ting insight the decidedly feminist stand-up come-
dian Janeane Garofalo shares in her comedy. And
not all cases of comic amusement involve relief,
either psychic or physical, as when I thoroughly
enjoy the intelligent wit delivered by Grammy-
nominated stand-up comedian Steven Wright in
his characteristic deadpan, slow, and monotonous
style, but am notmoved to sudden bursts of laugh-
ter or anything of the sort by it. Each of the three
mutually consistent theories of humor and comic
amusement help us understand the nature and ex-
perience of different cases of comic amusement by
illuminating their cognitive, affective, social, ethi-
cal, and psychological aspects.5
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1. This distinction is drawn in various translations. Joyce
translates the passage in question as follows:
Aristophanes laughed. You are quite right. Eryximachus
he said. I take it all back. But don’t be too hard on me. Not
that I mind if what I’m going to say is funny—all the better
if it is; besides, a comic poet is supposed to be amusing. I’m
only afraid of being utterly absurd. (1960, 189b, emphasis
mine)
Fowler as follows:
At this Aristophanes laughed, and “Quite right,
Eryximachus,” he said; “I unsay all that I have said. Do
not keep a watch on me for as to what is going to be said,
my fear is not so much of saying something absurd—since
that would be all to the good and native to my Muse—as
something utterly ridiculous.” (1925 189b, emphasis mine)
The original Greek:
Kαὶ τὸν Ἐρυξι´μαχον, ὠγαθε´, ϕα´ναι, Ἀριστόϕανες, ὅρα
τι´ ποιεῖς. γελωτοποιεῖς με´λλων λε´γειν, καὶ ϕυ´λακα´ με
τοῦ
λόγου ἀναγκα´ζεις γι´γνεσθαι τοῦ σεαυτοῦ, ἐα´ν τι γελοῖον
εἴπῃς, ἐξόν σοι ἐν εἰρη´νῃ λε´γειν.
Kαὶ τὸν Ἀριστοϕα´νη γελα´σαντα εἰπεῖν Eὖ λε´γεις, ὦ
(Burnet 1903)
2. This is certainly the nature of the brilliance of Louis
C.K., whose self-deprecating humor invites us to see our-
selves in him and in his failures and foibles.
3. Perhaps this is in part why satirical news shows such
as the Daily Show and the Colbert Report are able to get
so many public figures to appear on their programs, why
2008 U.S. vice-presidential hopeful Sarah Palin happily ap-
peared on the sketch comedy program Saturday Night Live
with Tina Fey whose impersonation of Palin is uncanny,
and Prince, a musician praised for his seriousness, origi-
nality, and dedication to his art, featured comedian David
Chappelle (as Prince) in the art for his recent single “Break-
fast Can Wait.”
4. Today’s stand-up comedians, I believe, are often or-
ators in this tradition.
5. I would like to thank Jeff Turner andTomBeasley for
their time and extensive feedback on an early draft of this
article; their insight greatly improved the analysis I offer
here. I am also grateful to Eva Dadlez for her comments
and encouragement. Finally, I thank the two anonymous
reviewers and the two editors of this journal for helpful
suggestions and comments.
